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Abstract
We study the growth dynamics of the size of manufacturing firms consid-
ering competition and normal distribution of competency. We start with the
fact that all components of the system struggle with each other for growth
as happened in real competitive bussiness world. The detailed quantitative
agreement of the theory with empirical results of firms growth based on a
large economic database spanning over 20 years is good .Further we find that
this basic law of competition leads approximately a power law scaling over a
wide range of parameters. The empirical datas are in accordance with present
theory rather than a simple power law.
PACS: 05.40.+j, 05.70.Ln, 64.60.Lx, 87.10.+e
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Recently, study of natural i.e. complex physical, biological and social systems has become
a new area of physical investigations. In complex systems a large number of elementary
interactions are taking place at the same time for large number of components and thereby
make it difficult to make an exact analysis. Thus statistical methods are normally used
to study these systems. Amaral et. al. [1], discussed firms growth dynamics based on
the interaction between different units of a complex system, which is a normal practice in
physics for simpler systems. However, we feel that in real business firms, this procedure is
not adequate because a large number of elementary interactions are taking place at the same
time including many with outside elements. In biological and social sciences, growth and
evolution processes are normally explained qualitatively through competition. We feel that
in describing complex systems, competition is more relevant parameter compared to internal
interactions particularly in social sciences. It is therefore interesting to study quantitatively
economical complex systems in the spirit of Darwin´s classical theory of biological evolution:
Survival for the fittest. This will also provide an alternative thinking in understanding of
complex systems. The present model may also be important for some other complex physical,
biological and economical systems.
We start with the fact that all components of a system struggle i.e. compete with each
other for growth, like all firms in economical world compete with each other to grow. The
same is the case between different species or groups in biological, political, religious or social
circle. The components which are better than their competitors will grow, while other shrink
till reach to a equilibrium state where they are equal to an average competitor of their class.
We formulate our problem for the growth of the manufacturing firms, because there is plenty
of quantitative data [1-5] and the term competition and competency is well understood. The
problem is also important due to considerable recent interest in economics in developing a
richer theory of the growth dynamics of a firm [5-10]. The present model is interesting as it
is close to real cut-throat competitive business..
In economics, what is commonly called “theory of the firm” is actually a theory of a
business unit [7,10]. Thus the standard model of the firm does not yield any prediction about
the distribution of the size of actual, multi-divisional firms or their growth rates. In the
present paper, we explore the stochastic properties of the dynamics of firm growth in line
with the work done by Simon [8] and Lucas [9]. Lucas suggests that the distribution of a firm
size depends on the distribution of its managerial ability in the economy rather than on the
2
factors that determine the size in the conventional theory of the firm [7,10]. As all firms are
competing with each other and political, economical, and technological factors are same for
all, we also believe that in long terms, the managerial ability of a firm is a determining factor
in its growth and the managerial ability is basically determined through its chief executive
officer (CEO). The management ability means the person´s effective ability to run a firm. It
includes the ability of a person to take (a) maximum advantages in given circumstances (b) to
correctly predict future business happenings, (c) courage to make necessary changes and take
risk and (d) maintain complete harmony in whole administration . We obtain the statistical
probability distribution of the growth rate of firms of certain size and the fluctuation in the
growth rates, measured by the width of the distribution, scale only approximately as a power
law with firm size. Finally we discuss the results with available data.
A business firm is a very complex system. We make the following assumptions to have
a simplified version of the whole system to study the statistical behavior of the growth rate
of the firms. However for the growth of a particular industry in a particular segment, other
factors like economical, political and technological will also be important.
(i) We consider the sales of a firm to define its size, although other parameters like
number of employee or assets can also be used [3]. The observed sales distributions of firms
are very close to log-normal distribution [5,6] except for very large firms. In general, we
expect a normal distribution of a variable. We therefore, define size of a firm equal to natural
logarithm of its sales (S).
(ii) The management ability of people vary from person to person. Here, by management
ability we mean the person´s inherent ability to run a pre-established business after proper
training. We, define quantitatively management ability M of a person (or competitive ability
in general) in arbitrary units, equal to size of the firm under his supervision, when the firm is
in equilibrium i.e. neglecting short term fluctuations, the growth rate is zero. In this case his
management ability is sufficient only for running the firm satisfactorily without any growth.
M = ln(S)|Equilibrium (1)
(iii) When the management ability (M) of a CEO is more than what is needed to handle
the firm under his control (ln(S)), the firm grows. As per common experience of growth rate
of a firm under same CEO for long time [11] and observed probabilistic distribution of the
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growth rate of the firms, we consider for mathematical simplicity that the growth rate (γ) of
the firm is directly proportional to the relative management ability (R) of its CEO, i.e.
γ = ln(
S1
S
) = kR (2)
The relative management ability of a CEO, is the difference of his management ability and
management ability needed to handle the firm:
R = |M − ln(S)| (3)
k is a constant of the system. S1 is the sales of the firm in the following year. Under
this assumption, the optimum size of a firm is determined through management ability of its
CEO (Soptimum = exp(M)) and the firm approaches to this size [11]. In Figure 1, we have
shown the variation of annual sell of a firm with initial sell 106 and is under a CEO, who can
handle satisfactorily a firm of annual sell 108.
(iii) We consider that the management ability of people in general (MG) is having a
normal distribution [12] with mean MG and standard deviation σG. Thus:
PG(M) =
1√
2piσG
exp−(M −MG)
2
2σ2G
(4)
where PG(M) is the probability of a person in general to have management ability equal to
M . We have shown it in Figure 2a.
(iv) Let us consider firms of annual sales S0. In general, they have their CEO of different
management ability. The firms under CEO with management ability M0, where M0 = ln(S0)
will be in equilibrium. We consider that this is also means of the management ability of CEO´s
of these firms. Basically a person is hired as CEO of a firm because he (a) is competent i.e.
his management ability is either equal or better than average of his group, (b) is having
strong influence on the share holders. We consider that political factors are the same for
all and all competent people have equal chance to become CEO, thus the distribution of
management ability of CEO of these firms for positive segment is in same way as people are
available.. For negative segment (M < M0), we consider the distribution as mirror image
of the positive segment as most of the people will be rejected on merit ground. This will
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give a symmetrical growth dynamics at zero growth rate. Further the over all distributions
of firm size is invariant with time, which is more or less true. The probability of a person
to be selected as CEO must decrease with his incompetency.. For big firms, this probability
decreases more rapidly as they are more mature and exigent. This will give truncated normal
distribution with mean management ability equal to M0. In Figures 2b, we have drawn
distribution of relative management ability of the CEO through Equation (3).
Under these assumptions and after normalization, the probability distribution of man-
agement ability (M) of CEO of firms of the size S0 (P (M/S0)) for M > M0 is given by:
P (M/S0) =
PG(M)
2
∞∫
M0
PG(M)dM
(5)
The probability distribution for relative management ability (P (R/S0)) is thus given by:
P (R/S0) =
PG(M0 +R)
2
∞∫
0
PG(M0 +R)dR
(6)
Using equations (3), (6) and normalization condition, the probability distribution of the
growth rate of firms of size S0 (P (γ/S0)) and standard deviation of the growth rate of these
firms (σ(S0)) are given by:
P (γ/S0) =
PG[M0 +
γ
k
]
2k
∞∫
0
PG(M0 +R)dR
(7)
σ2(S0) =
∞∫
0
P ( γ
S0
)γ2dγ
∞∫
0
P ( γ
S0
)dγ
= k2
∞∫
0
PG(M0 +R).R
2dR
∞∫
0
PG(M0 +R)dR
(8)
In Figure 2c, we have shown distribution of growth rate using Equation (7).
We compare our theory with growth rate of all publicly traded manufacturing companies
of US. in the 1994 Compustat database with standard industrial classification index of 2000-
3999. The distribution represents all annual growth rates observed in the 19 year period
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1974-1993. We consider k = 0.6, MG = 12 and σG = 1.3 for drawing theoretical curves. k
is chosen to match the magnitude of the growth rate while MG and σG are chosen to give
best fit in standard deviation vs. size. The value of MG = 12.0 signify that about 25%
of people have capacity to run a pre-established manufacturing firm of annual sell of about
5.105 dollars, after proper training and experience, which seems to be reasonable as this is
the size of small family businesses. In Figure 3a, we compare the probability density of the
growth rate for different initial sales while in Figure 3b, we compare the standard deviation
as a function of the initial sales. The straight line is a guide for the eye with slope ≃ 0.15.
We obtained all the four theoretical curves with a single set of two chosen parameters. The
agreement is reasonably good for all the curves.
Power law scaling [13,14] is one of the main feature of complex systems and has been
speculated in many physical [15-18], chemical [19], economical [20-23], biological [24,25],
geophysical [26] and others [27,28] systems. It has also been speculated in firm growth
dynamics. The present theory approximately leads to power law scaling. It is interesting to
observe that the general behavior of the empirical results is also close to present theoretical
prediction rather than any power law scaling (straight line fitting). Power law scaling is only
a crude approximation for these results for a interesting range of parameters.
In the present theory, the probability of small positive or negative growth is more than
zero growth for firms of annual sell less than 105 dollars. Normally the firms of this size either
grow to become competitive or soon get out of the market.
The standard deviation of management ability of people in general is 1.3, while the stan-
dard deviation of firms size for these data is 2.72 [5]. Thus the number of competent CEO
available per firm decreases very rapidly with increase of firm size. This means that for small
firms, many competent people are available and political considerations are more important
for selection. As a firm grow, merit consideration become more and more important. For
firms of annual sell more than 108 dollars, it become almost necessary to have many quasi
independent executives and decisions have to be taken collectively.. This is what happened
normally. The number of very large firms is less than what is given by log-normal distribu-
tion [5]. Perhaps this happened because of shortage of highly competent executive to run
these firms. In view of these comments, the present theory is more appropriate for firms with
annual sell below 108 dollars per year. For firms with sell larger than 108 dollars/year, it is
necessary to consider effective management ability of the whole management board, where
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perhaps theory proposed by Amaral et. al. [1] is also useful.
In Figure 4, we draw the variation of standard deviation of the growth rate as a function of
initial sales for (a) various values ofMG and (b) various values of σG.We considerMG = 12.0,
σG = 1.3, if it is not variable. The power law scaling behavior is approximately maintained in
all these cases. This approximate power law scaling behavior is not very sensitive to the value
of parameters under interested experimental range. This removes the necessity of self-tuning
of parameters controlling the dynamics of the system to their critical values as is needed
in critical behavior [29-31]. Perhaps, competition and normal distribution of competency is
behind the approximate scaling behavior in diverse fields, particularly in social and biological
sciences, independent of the microscopic details.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Variation of sell of a firm with initial sell 106 and is under a CEO who have
management ability to run a firm of sell 108.
Figure 2: Our theoretical model (a) probability density distribution of management abil-
ity (PG(M) vs. M) for public in general - a normal distribution. (b) Probability density
distribution of relative management ability (R = (M − ln(S)) for CEO of firms of sales S0
(P (R/S0) vs. R). (c) Probability density distribution of the growth rate for firm of sales S0
(P (γ/S0) vs. γ).
Figure 3: (a) Probability density distribution of the growth rate (P (γ/S0) vs. γ) for all
publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms. The solid lines are theoretical curves with k = 0.6,
MG = 12 and σG = 1.3. (b) Standard deviation of the growth rates as a function of the
initial sales (σ(S0) vs. S0). The solid lines is the theoretical curve with same parameters,
while broken line is a guide for eye with slope≃ 0.15.
Figure 4: Standard deviation of the growth rate as a function of the initial sales (σ(S0) vs S0)
for different values of (a) mean management ability of people in general MG (b) Standard
deviation of the management ability of the people in general (σG).
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